Preprint2026

Regulatory Constraints and Market Equilibrium: Evidence from Hong Kong's IPO Allocation Reform

Fuli Yang; Yu Liu

Institutions & Market Structure →

Abstract

We examine how IPO allocation regulation changes the contracts selected by issuers and underwriters, and why a regulatory minimum can become a standardized market allocation. We reconstruct a prospectus-date census of 161 Hong Kong operating-company IPOs in the first year after the August 2025 reform, reconcile initial and final three-part allocations, and develop a two-stage mechanism-choice and constrained-allocation model. We also examine listing-day and 60-session price adjustment. Among 141 ordinary issuers, 139 chose no-clawback Mechanism B and all began with the 10% minimum public tranche. Of 112 B offerings with cornerstone participation, 32 clustered within one percentage point of the 40–50–10 allocation vertex; the near-vertex share increased from 10.7% to 60.7% across offer-size quartiles. Median first-day gain was 22.49%; median subsequent 60-session Hang Seng Index-relative log performance was −7.57 percentage points. The price-adjustment evidence does not identify an allocation-induced return effect. The paper identifies a joint regulatory feasible set and endogenous contract vertex, distinguishing the legislated 40% open-book floor from the market-selected residual cornerstone share and showing how primary-market standardization can coexist with heterogeneous subsequent price discovery.

Author abstract from the Zenodo V2 record.

Keywords

Cite this paper

Yang, F., & Liu, Y. (2026). Regulatory Constraints and Market Equilibrium: Evidence from Hong Kong's IPO Allocation Reform (Version V2). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24152975

Version & publication history

  1. Version V1 · Zenodo · 10.5281/zenodo.24152583

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  2. Version V2 · Zenodo · 10.5281/zenodo.24152975

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  3. Added to GARCH Research Papers

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